Can Knowing-How Skepticism Exist? by Tsai, Cheng-Hung
 1 




Department of Philosophy, Soochow University, Taipei 
chtsai@scu.edu.tw 
 
[1] In a recent paper published in this journal (Berkeley 2002), István Berkeley argues 
(a) that knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that, and further, (b) that 
knowing-that may be reduced to knowing-how. To argue (a), Berkeley raises, 
following Ryle (1949), three objections to propositionalists, who “wish to reduce 
‘knowing how to’ to a special case of ‘knowing that’” ([3])1
 
. From (a) Berkeley draws 
two possible conclusions: the first, and minor one, is that “knowing-how and 
knowing-that represent two distinct and irreducible epistemic categories” ([15]), and 
the second, radical, one is that it is possible “to reduce knowing-that to a special case 
of knowing-how” ([16]), as what (b) states. The significance of insisting (a) and (b), 
in Berkeley’s view, is that they can be used to undermine Western skepticism.  
[2] The assumption, then, is that Western skepticism (which Berkeley calls 
“traditional skepticism”), no matter what its scope and form, builds on the category 
of propositional knowledge. Only within such a category can the epistemic gap 
between beliefs (or proposition content) and truth (an objective state of affairs, or 
reality) concerning those beliefs exist, and only then does the gap need to be filled (by, 
perhaps, proffering a reliabilist account of knowledge). It is the view of the skeptic, 
however, that any such effort must be in vain. For the sake of simplicity, let us call 
this knowing-that skepticism.  
 
[3] If Western skepticism is only knowing-that skepticism, it is merely a threat to a 
certain type of knowledge, i.e., propositional knowledge. Furthermore, if Berkeley’s 
application of Ryle is the correct one, and knowledge-that can be reduced to a form of 
knowledge-how, Western skepticism is deeply and irrevocably flawed, since it is 
difficult to formulate a non-trivial form of skepticism within the category of 
knowing-how (practical knowledge, competence knowledge, or skill). As Berkeley 
explains, “if we are dealing with a skill, …a single incidence of the putative application 
of that skill will never be sufficient to establish the fact that S possesses that skill. 
Nor, on the other hand, will a single failure in the performance of that skill prove that 
S does not possess it. Even the most skilled marksman will occasionally miss the 
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1 Note references are to sections numbers in Berkeley (2002).  
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target” ([23]). The only skepticism that Berkeley can offer in the category of 
knowing-how is what he terms “Chinese skepticism”, which doubts the worth or 
utility of possessing certain skill. Strictly speaking, however, Chinese skepticism is 
not a genuine skepticism about knowledge (no matter what type of knowledge). It 
“does not doubt that we have knowledge,” but rather assigns to each individual the task 
“to critique the knowledge that we have” ([27]; my italics). The formulation of 
Berkeley’s two arguments against skepticism, which I provide below, makes this 
relationship between Western skepticism and Chinese skepticism clear.  
 
The Argument from Knowledge Type (the Weak Version) 
P1. Western skepticism is formulated within the category of propositional 
knowledge (i.e., Western skepticism is knowing-that skepticism).  
P2. Western skepticism can be applied to the category of competence knowledge 
only if knowing-how can be reduced to knowing-that. 
P3. Knowing-that and knowing-how, contrary to the claims of the propostionalists, 
are sharply distinct.  
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
C. Western skepticism is restricted to the domain of propositional knowledge. 
 
The Argument from Knowledge Type (the Strong Version) 
P1. Western skepticism is formulated within the category of propositional 
knowledge. 
P2*. Western skepticism cannot get off the ground if knowing-that can be reduced 
to knowing-how (since knowing-how skepticism, if any, must be Chinese 
skepticism, which is not a genuine skepticism at all). 
P3*. Knowledge-that can be reduced to knowledge-how.  
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
C*. Western skepticism cannot get off the ground. 
 
[4] My objection to Berkeley’s criticism of Western skepticism is centered around 
two points. The first is that Berkeley has not succeeded in demonstrating that 
knowing-that skepticism is baseless, because he has not adequately shown that 
knowing-that can be reduced to knowing-how. The most Berkeley has shown is that if 
knowing-that can be reduced to knowing-how, then knowing-that skepticism cannot 
exist. Although Berkeley does tell us that we can reduce any propositional knowledge 
claim to knowing-how “simply by re-expressing that claim in terms of knowing-how”, 
this is a claim that rests on a grammatical or verbal level to which a priori knowledge, 
inductive knowledge, knowledge derived from memory, or propositions found in the 
Theory of Relativity will not be so easily reduced. But let us say, for the sake of 
argument, that Berkeley does find a way to restate these types of knowledge as 
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knowing-how. Even if he can, this does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a 
type of knowing-how skepticism that is more substantial than Berkeley’s Chinese 
skepticism. I will return to this point shortly. Before I do this, however, I will give a 
quick review of the two arguments.  
 
[5] Perhaps the most obvious target of the first argument is the third premise, P3. The 
accuracy of Ryle’s distinction has recently been reconsidered and criticized by 
Stanley and Williamson (2001). However, since Berkeley’s purpose in his article 
seems to be the application of Ryle’s distinction, and not its reevaluation, I will not 
critique Berkeley on these grounds. In fact, there is a more conspicuous weakness in 
the premise that the two arguments share in common, P1. It is Berkeley’s contention 
that Western skepticism has to be formulated within the category of propositional 
knowledge, but this is not necessarily so. It is conceivable that there is a kind of 
knowledge which is expressed by neither knowing-that nor knowing-how, and that 
a kind of skepticism exists about such knowledge. What comes to mind is 
knowledge of language. Michael Dummett has long argued that we should ascribe 
knowledge of a meaning-theory for a particular language to speakers, and the mode of 
such knowledge cannot be propositional, merely practical, or unconscious in a 
Chomskyan sense; for Dummett, “the classification of knowledge into theoretical and 
practical (knowledge-that and knowledge-how) is far too crude to allow knowledge 
of a language to be located within it” (Dummett 1993: x). Assuming Dummett is right, 
i.e., the mode of knowledge of language is implicit, the following kind of skepticism 
might arise: When theorists of language face two extensionally equivalent 
meaning-theories (see Quine 1972 and Evans 1981) and try to decide which theory 
should be ascribed to a speaker as the content of his linguistic knowledge, and when 
all linguistic evidence, as Quine suggests, is restricted to a speaker’s behavioural 
dispositions, there is no such thing as psychological reality for which a 
meaning-theory is true, and, subsequently, no room for knowledge of language.  
 
[6] For the moment, let us merely assume the premises P1, P2, P2*, and P3 are 
acceptable, and turn our focus to the strong version of the argument. I also assume 
P3* is correct, i.e., “S knows that p” can be reduced to “S knows how to do q”. The 
question to ask is: What should “q” be? If knowing-how or competence knowledge 
does play an important role in Berkeley’s full account of knowledge, it is worthwhile 
to characterize the concept very precisely. Berkeley tells us that the infinitive verbs 
which are suitable for substitution for “q” in “S knows how to q” are “verbs which 
refer to skills which require intelligent capacities, may be learned, and which refer to 
skills which may be demonstrated on more than one occasion” ([13]). Simple 
dispositions and a single manifestation of an ability are not adequate in 
characterizing competence knowledge, since the former may be mere conditioning, 
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and the latter may be a fluke.  
 
[7] But is Berkeley’s notion of knowing-how sufficient for characterizing competence 
knowledge? Ironically, one of Berkeley’s examples provides the contradiction to his 
argument. He mentions the case of “S knows how to identify objects.” The ability to 
identify objects, at first glance, seems trivial, but is not as simple as we generally 
think or as Berkeley seems to believe it is. When someone asks me to pass him a pen, 
I can do this easily, and do it on more than one occasion. But I also could respond to 
the request by passing the salt, or a glass of water, or any one of a variety of different 
objects. When I pass the pen, however, I identify that (the pen), and thus implicitly or 
tacitly possess, among other things, concept of pen, and demonstrative concepts. I am 
not saying that one has to articulate the concept PEN or give an accurate definition of 
“pen” when manifesting the ability to identify a pen; rather, I am referring to the 
conditions on the ability to identify objects such as a pen. It is not only the ability to 
identify objects that requires possession of (implicit) concepts, either. Arithmetic, 
chess, playing a musical instrument, and speaking a natural language all require such 
concepts.2
 
   
[8] Finally, if complex ability or competence knowledge is concept-involving (or, to 
put it even more strongly, is concept-constitutive), then one can imagine certain new 
forms of skepticism. For one thing, we can doubt whether an imaginary character in 
Kripke-like or Goodman-like thought experiments knows how to do addition or 
identify green objects. The character can successfully manifest his abilities to do 
“addition” or identify “green” objects; however, the concepts he implicitly possesses 
are “quus” rather than “plus”, and “grue” rather than “green”. In such cases, it is 
disputable whether the character really knows how to do addition, or identify green 
things. (One can insist that a necessary and sufficient condition for S’s knowing how 
to do q is that S can manifest q, which would negate the skepticism that I raised—but 
the price, it should be noted, is that there will no longer be any difference between 
someone doing addition and quaddition.) Another kind of knowing-how skepticism 
may arise when one assumes that the implicit concepts that constitute a complex 
ability are individuated holistically and externally. It is then possible the whole system 
of concepts is isolated from, or misrepresents, the so-called reality. But knowing-how 
skepticism in these two cases is different from Berkeley’s Chinese skepticism. The 
first skepticism does not claim that a subject S cannot play, say, chess or an 
instrument, but casts doubt on the constitutive element of S’s competence knowledge. 
Competence knowledge is always displayed by its possessor’s manifestation or 
performance; however, manifestation should not be confused with constitution. 
                                                 
2 The idea that knowing-how is concept-involving is inspired by, but not the story of, 
Searle’s notion of the Background (see e.g., Searle 1983).  
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Therefore, even if a person can manifest his abilities to identify water or do addition, 
a skeptic still could cast doubt on the concepts which are required in constituting the 
abilities in the following ways: Do such concepts even exist? How should the 
concepts be individuated (internally or externally)? Does a subject correctly possess, 
though tacitly, the concepts that are required?  
 
[9] Even when we assume that Berkeley is right and that all knowledge is identical 
with or can be reduced to knowing-how, his argument still lacks a complete 
explanation of what competence knowledge within knowing-how requires. 
Ultimately, this will involve rejecting a more sophisticated, constitutive form of 
knowing-how skepticism than his Chinese skepticism example and the rejection of 
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